Broadbent Real Estate v. Estate of Doran Hunt : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
Broadbent Real Estate v. Estate of Doran Hunt :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Olsen; Charles P. Sampson; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson.
David K. Smith.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Broadbent Real Estate v. Estate of Doran Hunt, No. 860352 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/263
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIZF 
UTAH 
DOCUivlCYT 
K F U 
50 
Aid 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARNUM BROADBENT REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, a Dissolved Partner-
ship, 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 
-vs-
THE ESTATE OF DORAN HUNT, by 
and through its Co-Personal 
Representatives, DORAN RAY 
HUNT and JOAN HUNT RALSTON, 
and HUNT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
Case No. 860352-CA 
Priority No. 14 b, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, PRESIDING 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801) 566-3373 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellants 
175 South West Temple 
Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
(801) 532-7300 
DEC 2 3 1987 — 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARNUM BROADBENT REAL ESTATE ) 
COMPANY, a Dissolved Partner- ] 
ship, ; 
Plaintiff/ ; 
Appellant, 
-vs-
THE ESTATE OF DORAN HUNT, by 
and through its Co-Personal 
Representatives, DORAN RAY 
HUNT and JOAN HUNT RALSTON, 
and HUNT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
i Case No. 860352-CA 
) Priority No. 14 b. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, PRESIDING 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSOS 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellants 
175 South West Temple 
Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
(801) 532-7300 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801) 566-3373 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED I OH REVThW . . . . . . . 
STATEMENT OF CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . 
SUMMARY i>l' ARGUMENT!'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Allphin Realty. Inc. vs. Sine. 595 P.2d 860 
(Utah 1979) 17 
Becker vs. Arnold. 591 P.2d 596 (Colo. App. 1979) . . . 23 
Campbell vs. Fowler. 520 P.2d 1285 (Kan. 1974); . . . . 23 
Carlson vs. Hamilton. 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 
(1958) 16 
Ferrara vs. Firschina. 533 P.2d 1351 (Nev. 1975). . . . 16 
FMA Financial Corp. vs. Build. Inc.. 17 Utah 2d 80, 
404 P.2d 670 29 
Gibson Bowles. Inc. vs. Montgomery. 625 P.2d 670 
(Ore. App. 1981) 34 
Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1982) 14, 29 
Hopkins vs. Wardley Corp.. 611 P.2d 1204 (1980) . . . . 33 
Kidd vs. Maldonado. 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) 29 
Land vs. Land. 605 P. 2d 1248 (Utah 1980) 15 
Litho Sales. Inc. v. Cutrubus. 636 P.2d 487 
(Utah 1981) 14 
Record Realty. Inc. vs. Hull. 552 P.2d 191 
(Wash. App. 1976) 23 
Riche vs. Jenkins. 641 P.2d 148 (Utah 1982) 16 
Schroeder vs. Rose, 701 P.2d 327 (Idaho App. 1985) . . 34 
Sharpe v. American Medical Systems. Inc., 671 P.2d 
185 (Utah 1983) 14 
Utah Valley Bank vs. Tannerf 636 P.2d 1060 
(Utah 1981) 15 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
10 S. Williston, Contracts. § 1287A (3d ed. 
W. Jaeger 1967) 16 
Respondents and Cross-Appellants, The Estate of Doran 
Hunt by and through its Co-Personal Representatives, Doran Ray 
Hunt and Joan Hunt Ralston and Hunt Development Company, by and 
through their counsel of record, Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, 
and pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, submit the following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. in that it 
is an appeal taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from 
a final judgment and pursuant to the Supreme Court's transfer of 
the appeal pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
presiding, rendered after a non-jury trial. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for 
review: 
1. Did the trial court err in holding that plaintiff 
was not entitled to a real estate commission because: 
(a) It did not fulfill its obligations under the 
Listing Agreement; or, 
(b) It breached its fiduciary duty to its prin-
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cipal, Hunt Development Company* 
2c Did the trial court err in refusing to award de-
fendants their attorney fees based upon the conduct of plaintiffs? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This is an action by a real estate broker to collect a 
three percent (3%) sales commission on a $3,250,000.00 sale which 
failed to close. The broker* Barnum-Broadbent Real Estate Company, 
and the seller, Hunt Development Company, through the late Doran 
Hunt, its President, entered into a non-exclusive "Listing Agree-
ment" with respect to a mobile home park located in Rock Springs, 
Wyoming. The Listing Agreement provided that a commission would 
be paid only if Barnum-Broadbent produced a buyer who would "con-
sumate the purchase" of the Park. The parties clearly understood 
that "consumate" meant that the sale must close. More specifically, 
the Listing Agreement provided: 
It is agreed that Barnum and Broadbent shall receive 
a 3% commission on the total sales price of the 
Grand View Mobile Home Park in Rock Springs, Wyoming, 
should they provide a purchaser who may in the future 
consumate the purchase of this mobile park, (emphasis 
added) 
On November 9, 1979, an earnest money receipt was signed by 
Groover-Hoffmann, Inc., through Larry Groover, and Hunt Develop-
ment Company through the late Doran Hunt. The earnest money receipt 
provided for a deposit of only $5,000.00 on a $3,250,000.00 sale. 
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Curiously, the earnest money deposit was in the form of a promissory 
note, which was to be replaced by a company check on or before 
November 16, 1979—seven days after the earnest money was signed. 
The note was not timely replaced by a legitimate deposit and, when 
the note was finally replaced, the check was "referred to maker" 
for insufficient funds. In addition, at the time the earnest money 
receipt was executed, Groover-Hoffmann's assets were less than 
$50,000.00 and its President, Larry Groover—who essentially testi-
fied that the company was his alter-ego—had in excess of $80,000.00 
of unsatisfied personal judgment liens docketed against him in 
Salt Lake County. Needless to say, this sale did not close. 
On November 23, 1979, a second offer by the Carlyle Group 
was presented by Barnum-Broadbent to Hunt Development Company. 
This offer failed to meet the terms of the Sales Proposal in Barnum-
Broadbent's possession and, thus, was countered by Doran Hunt on 
November 28, 1979, subject to written acceptance by the Buyer within 
ten days. The counter-offer was never accepted and, therefore, 
was cancelled according to its terms. 
The Park was finally sold to another buyer in accordance 
with the price and terms of the Sales Proposal, and a full commis-
sion of $97,500.00 was paid. 
B. Course Of Proceedings 
The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, presiding, on Tuesday, February 11, 1986. 
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Co Disposition In The Court Below 
The Court denied Barnum-Broadbent#s claim to a real estate 
commission on the grounds that Barnum-Broadbent failed to perform 
its obligations under the Listing Agreement, negligently misrepre-
sented the prospective purchaser's financial ability to the seller 
and breached its fiduciary duty to the seller. The court also 
denied defendants7 claim against Barnum-Broadbent's agent, Gary 
Larson, and Barnum-Broadbent for attorney's fees. 
D. Statement Of Facts 
1. In 1979, defendant Hunt Development Company, Inc. 
owned the Grandview Mobile Home Park in Rock Springs, Wyoming. 
(R. 497, 1 1). 
2. In October of 1979, Doran Hunt, the President of 
Hunt Development Company, was ill and could no longer oversee the 
management and finances of the Park and a decision was made to 
sell the Park. A "Sales Proposal" was issued which provided that 
the Park would be sold for the price of $3,250,000.00 with a down 
payment of $600,000.00 and the balance to be paid pursuant to a 
20-year contract bearing 12% interest. Certain trailers and per-
sonal property at the Park were also offered for sale at a price 
to be negotiated. (R. 497, % 2). 
3. In October of 1979, plaintiff-in-intervention, Gary 
Larson ("Larson"), was a licensed real estate agent employed by 
plaintiff, Barnum-Broadbent Real Estate Company ("Barnum-
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Broadbent"). Barnum-Broadbent was a partnership comprised of Brent 
Barnum and Ross Broadbent as general partners. (R. 497, f 3). 
4. In October of 1979, Larson obtained a copy of the 
Sales Proposal and, based upon the recommendations of a social 
acquaintance, presented it to Larry Groover, the President of 
Groover-Hoffmann, Inc ("Groover-Hoffmann")• (R. 496, 1 4 ) . 
5. Larry Groover told Larson that he would be inter-
ested in making an offer on the Park and that he was capable of 
purchasing it in accordance with the price and terms set forth in 
the Sales Proposal. (R. 496, f 5). 
6. Larson contacted Doran Hunt in order to obtain a 
listing agreement on the Park. (R. 496, f 6). 
7. On November 9, 1979, a "Listing Agreement" was nego-
tiated between Larson and Doran Hunt which specifically provided: 
It is agreed that Barnum and Broadbent shall 
receive a 3% commission on the total sales 
price of the Grand View Mobile Home Park in 
Rock Springs, Wyoming, should they provide a 
purchaser, who may in the future consumate 
[sic] the purchase of this mobile park. 
(R. 496, 1 7). 
8. At the time the Listing Agreement was negotiated, 
Larson knew that Doran Hunt did not intend to pay a commission if 
the sale of the Park was not consummated. (R. 496, % 8). 
9. At the time the Listing Agreement was negotiated, 
Larson knew that the phrase "consumate a purchase" meant that the 
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sale must close. Larson understood that an earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase was not a closing. (R. 495, f 9). 
10. Larson and Barnum-Broadbent had a financial interest 
in obtaining a buyer for the Park. (R. 495, f 10). 
11. On November 9, 1979, Larson presented an offer by 
Groover-Hoffmann to Hunt Development Company for the purchase of 
the Park. The offer provided for a down payment of $600,000.00, 
which was to be paid in full or or before February 9, 1980 with 
the balance of the $3,250,000.00 sales price to be amortized over 
twenty years bearing an interest rate of 12%. (R. 495, f 11). 
12. Larson represented to Doran Hunt at the time the 
Groover-Hoffmann earnest money offer was presented, that Groover-
Hoffmann was a good and capable buyer, which representation was 
false. (R. 495, f 12). 
13. Groover-Hoffmann,s earnest money deposit consisted 
of a $5,000.00 promissory note which was to be replaced by a company 
check on or before November 16, 1979. (R. 495, f 13). 
14. Contrary to their standard practice, neither Larson 
nor Barnum-Broadbent investigated the creditworthiness of Groover-
Hoffmann before making the representation to Doran Hunt that 
Groover-Hoffmann was a good and capable buyer; they obtained no 
financial statements for either Groover-Hoffmann or Larry Groover, 
nor did they obtain any bank statements or verify any bank 
accounts. (R. 495, 1 14). 
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15. The creditworthiness and financial ability of 
Groover-Hoffmann to perform pursuant to the earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase were material to Hunt Development Company's 
decision to accept Groover-Hoffmann's earnest money offer. (R. 494, 
1 15). 
16. Larson's representation to Doran Hunt concerning 
Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability was based solely on Larry 
Groover's statement that he was financially capable of buying the 
Park and Larson's observing Larry Groover conducting financial 
seminars concerning Egyptian artifacts and diamonds. (R. 494, % 16). 
17. Groover-Hoffmann was not a good and capable buyer in 
November 1979, contrary to Larson's representations. (R. 494, f 
17). 
18. At the time Groover-Hoffmann made its earnest money 
offer to Hunt Development Company, Larry Groover was subject to 
outstanding personal judgments in an amount exceeding $80,000.00; 
Groover-Hoffmann had a net worth of less than $50,000.00; and 
Groover-Hoffmann was in the process of winding up its affairs prior 
to dissolution. (R. 494, f 18). 
19. During the time period immediately prior to making 
its earnest money offer to Hunt Development Company, Groover-
Hoffmann had been turned down for a loan for office furniture by 
Commercial Security Bank because of Larry Groover's outstanding 
judgments. 
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(R. 493, f 19). 
20. The promissory note representing the earnest money 
deposit was not replaced by a company check until November 21, 
1979, at the earliest. (R. 493, f 20). 
21. When it was deposited by Barnum-Broadbent the 
Groover-Hoffmann check failed to clear the bank. The check was 
returned stamped "refer to maker" because Groover-Hoffmann's 
account had insufficient funds to cover the check. The check was 
processed a second time and was paid sometime after November 30, 
1979. (R. 493, f 21). 
22. Neither Barnum-Broadbent nor Larson informed Doran 
Hunt that Groover-Hoffmann's check had bounced. (R. 493, f 22). 
23. Every piece of property that Larry Groover purchased 
through his various entities since November of 1979 has either 
been taken back by the sellers through deeds in lieu of foreclosure 
or lost through foreclosure. (R. 493, % 23). 
24. At the time Larson told Doran Hunt that Groover-
Hoffmann was a good and capable buyer, Gary Larson knew that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation. 
(R. 493, 1f 24) . 
25. Larson and Barnum-Broadbent acted fraudulently and 
negligently in making the representation to Doran Hunt regarding 
Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability. (R. 492, f 25). 
26. Larson's representation to Doran Hunt concerning 
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Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability was made to induce Doran Hunt 
to accept Groover-Hoffmann's offer which if the sale closed would 
result in a pecuniary gain to Larson and Barnum-Broadbent. (R. 
492, f 26). 
27. Doran Hunt did not know that Groover-Hoffmann was 
not a good and capable buyer and he reasonably relied upon, and 
was induced by, Larson's representations to the contrary to accept 
Groover-Hoffmann's offer. (R. 492, 1f 27). 
28. As a direct and proximate result of Doran Hunt's 
reasonable reliance upon Larson's representation that Groover-
Hoffmann was a good and capable buyer, which was not true when made, 
Hunt Development Company, when it discovered that Groover-Hoffmann 
was not a good and capable buyer, rescinded the earnest money agree-
ment and Groover-Hoffmann's earnest money deposit was returned. 
The recission and the deposit were accepted by Groover-Hoffmann. 
(R. 492, 28). 
29. On November 23, 1979, a second earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase was submitted to Doran Hunt by Larson on 
behalf of the Carlyle Group. (R. 492, f 29). 
30. The Carlyle Group's earnest money receipt and offer 
to purchase offered a total purchase price of $3,100,000.00 with 
$500,000.00 down and the balance amortized on a 25-year contract 
bearing a 10% interest for the first two years and 12% thereafter. 
(R. 492, f 30). 
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31. The Carlyle Group's offer was substantially less 
favorable to Hunt Development Company than the price and terms 
set forth in the Sales Proposal. (R. 491/ f 31). 
32. On November 28# 1979, Doran Hunt on behalf of Hunt 
Development Company, rejected the Carlyle Group's offer and sub-
mitted a counter-offer which restated the price and terms set forth 
in the Sales Proposal and which, by its own terms, expired 10 days 
from November 28, 1979. (R. 491, f 32). 
33. The Carlyle Group did not accept Hunt Development 
Company's counter-offer. (R. 491, f 33). 
34. Larson and Barnum-Broadbent did not produce a ready, 
willing and able purchaser to Hunt Development Company for the 
purchase of the Park. (R. 491, f 34). 
35. On February 5, 1980, Barnum-Broadbent's attorney, 
David S. Dolowitz, sent a letter to Doran Hunt's attorney, Alan 
K. Jeppesen, wherein Mr. Dolowitz informed Mr. Jeppesen that if 
Hunt Development Company did not accept an attached offer by the 
Carlyle Group—which offered a price and terms substantially less 
favorable than the price and terms set forth in the Sales Propos-
al—a lawsuit would be filed by Barnum-Broadbent seeking a com-
mission. (R. 491, f 35). 
36. Doran Hunt did not accept the second offer submitted 
on behalf of the Carlyle Group by David S. Dolowitz. (R. 490, f 36). 
37. On March 3, 1980, Barnum-Broadbent was informed 
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through David S. Dolowitz that the Park had been sold to another 
buyer. (R. 490, % 37). 
38. Hunt Development Company paid a full 3% broker's 
commission on the eventual sale of the Park. (R. 490, % 38). 
39. This action was filed on May 27, 1980. (R. 490, 1f 39). 
40. Between May 27, 1980 and September 30, 1982, this 
action remained dormant. (R. 490, f 40). 
41. Hunt Development Corporation was forced to expend 
$16,095.00 in attorneys' fees to defend this action, wherein Barnum-
Broadbent seeks a commission based upon Hunt Development Company's 
rescission of the Groover-Hoffmann earnest money agreement and re-
jection of the Carlyle Group's offer. (R. 490, 1f 41) . 
42. On September 30, 1982, defendants moved the Court 
for an Order dismissing the action based upon plaintiff's failure 
to prosecute for over two years. (R. 490, % 42). 
43. On November 8, 1982, defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
was granted. Barnum-Broadbent was promptly informed of the dis-
missal by its counsel, David S. Dolowitz. (R. 490, f 43). 
44. On July 17, 1983, Doran Hunt died. (R. 489, f 44). 
45. On September 19, 1983, plaintiffs moved the Court 
for an order vacating the dismissal of this action based upon plain-
tiffs' contention that both Barnum-Broadbent and Larson were pre-
cluded from prosecuting the action based upon Section 362(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which also precluded the Court from dismissing 
- 12 -
the action for failure to prosecute. Barnum-Broadbent has never 
filed a bankruptcy petition, (R. 489, t 45)• 
46. Larson had filed a bankruptcy petition with the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah in 1981. (R. 489, 
1 46). 
47. On August 20, 1982, Ross Broadbent, a partner of 
Barnum-Broadbent had filed an individual Chapter 11 Petition for 
Bankruptcy; this Petition was dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court 
on May 24, 1983. (R. 489, f 47). 
48. Between May 27, 1980, when this action was filed 
and October 11, 1983, when plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Dismissal 
was granted, Barnum-Broadbent and Larson did not pursue the action 
because they could not find an attorney who would take the matter 
on a contingency basis. (R. 490, f 43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court properly denied plaintiff's claim 
to a real estate commission based on its findings that the plaintiff 
failed to meet the obligations imposed upon it by the Listing Agree-
ment and, in addition, that plaintiff negligently misrepresented 
failed to convey material facts to its principal, Hunt Development 
Company, concerning the prospective purchaser's financial ability 
and perform under the earnest money agreement, thus breaching its 
fiduciary duty. 
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2. The trial court erred in refusing to award defendants 
their attorney's fees incurred in defending this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the findings and judgment of the trial court, 
after a trial on the merits, this Court must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Hunts, and the judgment must be 
affirmed if those findings are substantiated by the evidence. 
Sharpe v. American Medical Systems. Inc., 671 P.2d 185 (Utah 1983). 
It is not this Court's duty to retry the facts and this Court must 
presume that the trial court's findings are correct and, if they 
are supported by substantial evidence in the record, those facts 
should not be overturned. Further, this Court must view the evi-
dence and all inferences that might reasonably be made from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment entered. Hal 
Taylor Assocs. v. Union America. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). 
Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981). 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM TO A REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION ON THE BASIS THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO PERFORM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE LISTING AGREEMENT 
In Points 1, 2 and 3 of its Brief, Barnum-Broadbent argues 
thatf as a matter of law, it was merely required to produce a pur-
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chaser whose offer to purchase the Park was accepted by Doran Hunt 
whether or not the sale of the Park actually closed. This argument 
is contrary to the terms of the Listing Agreement, the intent of 
the parties to the Listing Agreement and Utah law. 
In construing contracts, the intent of the parties gov-
erns. Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981); Land 
vs. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). The intent of the parties 
to the Listing Agreement — that a commission would be paid if, 
but only if, a sale of the Park was consummated by a purchaser 
produced by Barnum-Broadbent — is in clear and understandable 
language and was deliberately committed to writing and endorsed 
by the parties. This Court should affirm the trial court's honoring 
of that intent. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Carlson vs. 
Hamilton. 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958): 
People should be entitled to contract on their 
own terms without the indulgence of paternalism 
by courts in the alleviation of one side or 
another from the effects of a bad bargain. 
Also they should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that actually may be unreasonable 
or which may lead to hardship on one side. 
It is only where it turns out that one side 
or the other is to be penalized by the enforce-
ment of the terms of a contract so unconscion-
able that no decent, fair-minded person would 
view the ensuing result without being possessed 
with a profound sense of injustice, that equity 
will deny the use of its good offices in the 
enforcement of such unconscionability. 
In Peck vs. Judd, Mr. Justice Worthen poignantly 
expressed the thought when he said that it is 
not our perogative to step in a renegotiate 
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the contract of the parties . . . . There is 
no reason why we should consider the vendee 
privileged . . . unless the conditions . . . 
are unconsionable . . . and we should recognize 
and honor the right of persons to contract 
freely and to make real and genuine mistakes 
when the dealings are at arms length. 
8 Utah 2nd at 274, 332 P.2d at 990 (citations omitted). 
Listing agreements, like all contracts, may contain condi-
tions precedent to brokers' earning of their commissions. In Fer-
rara vs. Firsching, 533 P.2d 1351 (Nev. 1975), the court set forth 
the principle as follows: 
The payment of a broker's commission, however, 
may be predicated on a specified condition. 
* * * 
Whatever may be the customs and usage respecting 
the broker's right to a commission, when he 
presents a purchaser ready, willing and able 
to perform, the parties by their agreement 
may make this right pendant on an express condi-
tion such as actual sale. Or, other qualifi-
cations may be incorporated such as "out of 
purchase money," "cash payment," "upon effecting 
a sale," "upon consummation of a sale," "on 
closing of title," "when title has passed," 
"if deal went through," or "on the date formal 
transfer is made." 
Id. at 1353. See also 10 S. Williston, Contracts, § 1287A (3d 
ed. W. Jaeger 1967 and Supp 1985). 
In Riche vs. Jenkins, 641 P.2d 148 (Utah 1982), a broker's 
suit for a real estate commission, the Utah Supreme Court reempha-
sized the 
important principle of contract law the con-
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tracting parties are at liberty to make whatever 
agreement they desire and to employ particular 
words to limit their liability in certain in-
stances . 
Id. at 150. The Riche court went on to state that "we are not at 
liberty to disregard the language chosen by and employed by the 
parties and broaden the liability in favor of one party at the 
expense of the other. Id. 
Addressing facts similar to those in this case, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allphin Realty. Inc. vs. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 
1979), affirmed the principle that a contract should be enforced 
according to its terms despite any claimed unfairness. In that 
case, the listing agreement provided that the broker would be paid 
a commission if the property was sold to one of the persons listed 
in the listing agreement or to one of their associates. The broker 
produced a prospective purchaser who it claimed was an associate 
of one of the persons listed in the listing agreement. Although 
the prospective purchaser offered to purchase the property in ac-
cordance with the seller's terms, the seller rejected the purchaser 
and no sale was consummated. The broker sued for its commission, 
but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller 
on the ground that the listing agreement failed to satisfy the 
statute of frauds. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court did not address the 
statute of frauds issue but, rather, reverse the decision under 
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the principle of appellate review that the trial court should be 
affirmed if there is any proper ground for the trial court's ruling 
even if the trial court assigns an incorrect reason for its ruling. 
The Supreme Court then went on to affirm the summary judgment on 
the basis that the complaint failed to state a cause of action on 
the grounds that the purported purchaser was not one of those listed 
in the document and there was never a sale made. The court's rea-
soning was as follows: 
The commission was to be paid only in the com-
mission of a sale to one of the persons listed 
in the document. 
* * * 
Plaintiff drafted the document and it was in-
cumbent upon it to comply therewith if it was 
to earn the stated commission. Had the language 
been in the usual form of real estate listings 
[that a commission is promised to be paid if 
a ready, able and willing purchaser is produced 
who agrees to the price demanded by the seller], 
then there may well be merit to a claim for a 
commission even though the seller should refuse 
to consummate the sale. However, in the instant 
case, there was no agreement on the part of 
the defendant to accept the offer made, and 
since no sale was consummated, no commission 
was earned. 
The plaintiff further contends that the pur-
ported purchaser was an "associate" of one of 
the purchasers named in the document, to wit: 
a brother. We need not decide whether the 
brother was an "associate" within the meaning 
of the document because the fact no sale was 
made is controlling here. 
Id. at 861 (emphasis in original). 
- 18 -
In this case, the trial court found that the intent of 
the parties to the Listing Agreement was that a commission would 
be earned only if a sale of the Park to a purchaser produced by 
Barnum-Broadbent closed, and that an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase was not a closing. The evidence adduced at trial 
amply supports these findings. Specifically, Gary Larson, Barnum-
Broadbent' s agent, testified as follows: 
Q: (by Mr. 01sen): You went and asked Doran 
Hunt if you might have an exclusive, didn't 
you? 
A: I probably did. I think I did, but I didn't expect 
it. 
* * * 
Q: And then you discussed another part of the agreement, 
You discussed when you would receive a commission, 
and Doran Hunt told you he only wanted to pay a 
commission if the park was sold; isn't that right? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And the word you chose was "consummate," correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And "consummate" meant "sold?" didn't it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And at the time the word "consummate" was chosen, 
at the time of that conversation, you had an under-
standing that "consummate" meant "sold;" didn't you? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: You had an understanding that "consummate" meant 
an actual closing; doesn't it? 
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* * * 
A: That's right. 
* * * 
Q: And at that time, you understood Doran Hunt's intent, 
didn't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: He would only pay you a commission if the sale 
closed, correct? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And that was your clear-and-understood, unequivocal 
understanding, wasn't it? 
A: Right. 
* * * 
Q: So, you asked Mr. Hunt to insert some [additional] 
terms in the agreement; didn't you? 
A: Answer. 
Q: And one of those terms was if you brought in a buyer 
that he would use due diligence in proceeding with 
the sale; correct? 
* * * 
A: Yes. 
Q: And he told you, no, he wouldn't put that in the 
agreement? 
* * * 
A: Correct. 
* * * 
Q: And then you sat down at your typewriter and typed 
the agreement, the listing agreement? And the list-
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ing agreement did not contain the words "ready, 
willing and able" for a buyer, did it? 
A: No, it did not. 
Q: It contained the word "consummate," right? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And the listing agreement did not contain the words 
"due diligence," did it? 
A: No, it did not. 
Transcript, pp. 123-130. 
It follows that the intent of the parties to the Listing 
Agreement was that a commission was to be paid only if the Park 
was sold to a purchaser produced by Barnum-Broadbent. This did 
not happen. 
Furthermore, Barnum-Broadbent's argument that because 
Groover-Hoffmann's Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchaser 
was signed as accepted by Doran Hunt, he was obligated to pay a 
real estate commission. Again, this argument ignores the trial 
court's findings and the substantial evidence supporting those 
findings. In that regard, the trial court found that Barnum-Broad-
bent and Larson acted negligently in representing to Doran Hunt 
the financial ability of Groover-Hoffmann to purchase the Park and 
that the representation was made to induce Doran Hunt to accept 
Groover-Hoffmann's offer. (R. 492, %% 25-26). The trial court also 
found that Doran Hunt reasonably relied upon, and was induced by, 
Larson's representations concerning Groover-Hoffmann's financial 
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ability when he accepted Groover-Hoffmann's offer. (R. 492, % 27). 
In light of the fact that Barnum-Broadbent, through its 
agent, Gary Larson, negligently misrepresented facts to Doran Hunt 
concerning Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability to induce Doran 
Hunt to accept Groover-Hoffmann's offer, it is disingenuous for 
Barnum-Broadbent to argue that Doran Hunt's acceptance of that 
offer entitled it to a real estate commission. Furthermore, the 
majority of decisions referred to by Barnum-Broadbent in Points 
1, 2 and 3 of its Brief provide that when brokers act negligently, 
in bad faith, or in breach their fiduciary duties, they are not en-
titled to a commission merely because a sales agreement is made 
between a prospective buyer and the seller. 
This Court should, therefore, refrain from disturbing 
the trial court's findings that the Listing Agreement and the intent 
of the parties to the Listing Agreement required that a sale take 
place before a commission was earned. Neither the Listing Agreement 
nor the intent of the parties contemplated that a commission would 
be earned merely upon the execution of an Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase. Furthermore, the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase by Larry Groover was accepted by Doran Hunt 
based upon negligent misrepresentations made by Barnum-Broadbent 
thereby negating any legal right to a commission solely contingent 
upon Doran Hunt's acceptance. 
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Ill 
GROOVER-HOFFMANN WAS NOT A READY. WILLING 
AND ABLE PURCHASER 
Even if this Court holds that Barnum-Broadbent was merely 
required to produce a ready, willing and able purchaser to earn 
its commission, the trial court's ruling should, nevertheless, be 
affirmed because Groover-Hoffmann was not a ready, willing and able 
purchaser. 
The burden of proof with respect to the readiness, wil-
lingness and ability of the purchaser was on Barnum-Broadbent at 
trial. Campbell vs. Fowler, 520 P.2d 1285 (Kan. 1974); Record Real-
ty, Inc. vs. Hull. 552 P.2d 191 (Wash. App. 1976); Becker vs. Ar-
nold, 591 P.2d 596 (Colo. App. 1979). Barnum-Broadbent argues, 
however, that the burden of proof to show that Groover-Hoffmann 
was not a ready, willing and able purchaser shifted to Hunt Develop-
ment Company because Doran Hunt accepted Groover-Hoffmann's offer 
to purchase. Since Doran Hunt was induced to accept Groover-
Hoffmann's offer based upon Barnum-Broadbent's negligent misrepre-
sentations concerning Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability, Hunt 
Development Company submits that the burden of proof remains with 
Barnum-Broadbent. Nevertheless, the evidence adduced at trial 
demonstrates that at the time the earnest money agreement was made 
between Groover-Hoffmann and Hunt Development Company, Groover-
Hoffmann was not a ready, willing and able purchaser. 
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The trial court found that Groover-Hoffmann's offer pro-
vided for a down payment of $600,000 which was to be paid in full 
on or before February 9, 1980, with the balance of the $3,250,000.00 
sales price to be amortized over 20 years bearing an interest rate 
of 12%. (R. 495, % 11). The trial court found that Groover-
Hoffmann's earnest money deposit consisted of a $5,000 promissory 
note which was to be replaced by a company check on or before Novem-
ber 16, 1979, but was not replaced by a company check until November 
21, 1979 at the earliest. (R. 495, % 13; R. 493, if 20). The trial 
court found that when the company check was deposited by Barnum-
Broadbent, it bounced because Groover-Hoffmann's account had in-
sufficient funds. It was not until sometime after November 30, 
1979, that the check finally cleared the bank. (R. 493, f 21). 
Concerning Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability to pur-
chase the Park, the trial court found that every piece of property 
that Larry Groover purchased through his various entities since 
November of 1979 has either been taken back by the sellers through 
deeds in lieu of foreclosure or lost through foreclosure. (R. 493, 
f 23). The trial court found that at the time Groover-Hoffmann 
made its earnest money offer, Larry Groover was subject to out-
standing judgments in an amount exceeding $80,000; had a net worth 
of less than $50,000; and Groover-Hoffmann was in the process of 
winding up its affairs prior to dissolution. (R. 494, f 18). The 
trial court found that immediately before it made its earnest money 
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offer to Hunt Development Company, Groover-Hoffmann had been turned 
down for a loan for office furniture by Commercial Security Bank* 
(R. 493, 1 19). 
The trial court's findings concerning Groover-Hoffmann's 
financial ability to purchase the Park are amply supported by the 
evidence adduced at trial. (See, generally. Transcript pp. 192-
207). Furthermore, Larry Groover testified that he had neither a 
written commitment from any lender or investor nor applied for a 
loan for the $600,000 down payment at the time he made his offer 
to Hunt Development Company to purchase the Park. (Transcript p. 
198, line 24; p. 199, lines 1-6). The only testimony in the record 
indicating the Groover-Hoffmann was financially able to purchase 
the Park was Larry Groover's unsubstantiated testimony that he could 
have raised the money. 
It follows that regardless of who had the burden of proof 
at trial, the trial court's ultimate finding that Groover-Hoffmann 
was not financially able to purchase the Park was substantiated 
by the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal. Thus, all 
of Barnum-Broadbent's arguments should be rejected. 
IV 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE SALE WAS NOT 
CONSUMMATED BECAUSE GROOVER-HOFFMANN WAS NOT 
A READY, WILLING AND ABLE PURCHASER 
Barnum-Broadbent urges this Court to reverse the trial 
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court's findings that the sale of the Park was not consummated 
because Doran Hunt's actions frustrated the sale. The evidence 
does not support such a result. 
As the trial court's findings demonstrate, it was not 
until sometime after November 30, 1979, that Groover-Hoffmann's 
earnest money deposit was actually made and, therefore, Groover-
Hoffmann was in default under the earnest money agreement until at 
least November 30th. (R. 493, f 21). On December 3, 1979, Doran 
Hunt missed an appointment with Larry Groover and Gary Larson to 
review the books at the Park. (Transcript p. 144, line 23). How-
ever, on that same day, Larry Groover told Gary Larson that he 
wanted his earnest money deposit back. (Transcript p. 145, lines 
23-25). On December 10, 1979, a mutual rescission was signed by 
Doran Hunt and Larry Groover and Groover's earnest money deposit 
was returned. (R. 492, f 28). 
Concerning the missed appointment, the evidence adduced 
at trial clearly shows that Doran Hunt was seriously ill, and that 
Gary Larson knew about the illness. (Transcript p. 126, line 23; 
p. 127, lines 20-23); p. 234. lines 4-7). In addition, Bonnie 
May, Doran Hunt's sister, testified at trial that after Larson 
complained to her about the Groover transaction, she asked her 
brother what the situation was. He told her that he had found 
"after he has signed the agreement that Groover was a flake, a 
promoter and a pyramid schemer." (Transcript pp. 234, 235). 
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Equally significant concerning the issue of why the Park 
was not sold to Groover-Hoffmann is the fact that on November 23, 
1979, more than a week before Groover-Hoffmann's check finally 
cleared the bank, Gary Larson began pursuing a second offer to 
purchase made by an entity known as the Carlyle Group. (R. 492, f 
29). The Carlyle Group's offer, although substantially less favor-
able to Hunt Development Company than the price and terms set forth 
in the Sales Proposal, was supported by substantial financial docu-
mentation concerning the Carlyle Group's ability to purchase the 
Park. (Transcript p. 146, line 19). In fact, Doran Hunt made a 
written counter-offer to the Carlyle Group on November 28, 1979, 
two days before Groover-Hoffmann's check cleared the bank. (Tran-
script p. 141, lines 24-25). The Carlyle Group did not accept 
Mr. Hunt's counter-offer. (R. 491, f 33). 
The foregoing evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn 
from that, amply support the trial court's findings that the sale 
to Groover-Hoffmann was not consummated because Groover-Hoffmann 
was not a ready, willing and able buyer, not because Mr. Hunt's 
actions frustrated the sale. That evidence shows that Groover-
Hoffmann had bounced checks, that Mr. Hunt was ill and that Mr. 
Hunt acquired information after the earnest money agreement was 
signed to the effect that Mr. Groover was a "flake.11 Further, 
Gary Larson was actively pursuing the second offer by the Carlyle 
Group, whose ability to buy the Park was amply supported by finan-
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cials, during the period that the sale to Groover-Hoffmann failed. 
Consequently, this Court should not disturb the trial court's find-
ings that the sale failed because Groover-Hoffmann was not a ready, 
willing and able purchaser. 
A final point is worthy of discussion. David K. Smith, 
Esq., Barnum-Broadbent's attorney, attempts to argue that the reason 
the sale failed was because Mr. Hunt received an offer to purchase 
the Park from Robert H. Hammond on or about November 8, 1979. He 
supports this argument with a letter dated November 8, 1979, from 
Mr. Hammond to his real estate agent, Donald H. Barnett. Mr. Smith, 
in Barnum-Broadbent's Brief, argues that Doran Hunt's relunctance 
to enter into good-faith negotiations with Groover-Hoffmann was 
that he had already received the offer for the purchase of the 
Park from Mr. Hammond. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). The Letter re-
ferred to by Mr. Smith, and appended to his Brief, was not received 
into evidence at trial. Although the letter is dated November 8, 
1979, no evidence was adduced as to when Mr. Hunt received the 
letter or accepted the offer contained therein. Mr. Smith does 
not argue to this Court that the letter should have been received 
in evidence. Rather, Mr. Smith attempts to mislead this Court by 
referring to evidence outside of the record and appending that 
evidence to his Brief. Not only should Mr. Smith's references to 
the letter be disregarded, but Mr. Smith should be admonished to 
refrain from such actions in the future. 
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v 
BARNUM-BROADBENT BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY 
DUTY TO HUNT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
The trial court found that Barnum-Broadbent and Larson 
were agents of, and owed a fiduciary duty to, Doran Hunt. Kidd 
vs. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984); Hal Taylor Associates 
vs. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). As such, Barnum-
Broadbent and Larson had a duty to produce a purchaer according 
to the terms and conditions of Doran Hunt's offer and to do so 
without any dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation which might levac 
Doran Hunt vulnerable to the loss of his bargain and other damages. 
FMA Financial Corp. vs. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1965). The trial court found that Barnum-Broadbent and Larsor 
breached their fiduciary duty in the following particulars: 
1. By failing to inform Doran Hunt that Groover-
Hoffmann's check had not been timely deposited and when it 
finally was deposited has bounced (R. 493, H% 20-22) and; 
2. By negligently telling Doran Hunt that Groover-
Hoffmann was a good and capable buyer when Gary Larson knew 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a 
representation. (R. 493, %% 24-25). 
Concerning Larson's representation that Groover-Hoffmann 
was a good and capable buyer, Gary Larson gave the following testi-
mony at trial: 
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Q: (By Mr. 01sen): When Doran Hunt asked you 
if Groover-Hoffmann was a capable buyer, 
you told him "yes"? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: You told him "yes" because you sat at a 
seminar where they talked about diamonds; 
correct? You told him "yes" because you 
sat at a seminar where they talked about 
Egyptian artifacts; right? 
A: All of those are part of it. 
Q: You told him "yes" because Dr. Moses, 
who you met from the Freeman Institute, 
said Larry Groover was all right; correct? 
A: That's not correct. He said alot more 
than just "all right." 
Q: He said he was good? 
A: That he was capable of working projects, 
which he did. He sold the Timber Leaf 
Project right at the same time. 
Q: You don't know that, do you? 
A: I was one of the investors in it. 
Q: You were one of the investors in Timber 
Leaf? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So, you did know it was a small investment; 
not alot of cash was required, was it? 
A: Oh, on my part it was small. The total 
amount, you'll have to ask Larry. 
Transcript p. 135. 
Concerning the Timber Leaf Project, Mr. Groover testified 
that he and a couple of partners raised about $250,000 to buy a 
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couple of units in the project. (Transcript 172-173). By contrast, 
Mr. Larson testified that his understanding concerning the Timber 
Leaf Project was as follows: 
The fact that [Mr. Groover] was a few days 
late on his earnest money, he was out of town, 
and I knew he was looking at a project called 
Timber Leaf that he ended up consummating a 
$10,000,000 sale shortly right after our earnest 
money was not able to be consummated. 
Transcript p. 70, lines 10-16. 
Mr. Larson went on to testify concerning his "qualifica-
tion" of Mr. Groover as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. 01sen) And, in fact, your intro-
duction to Larry Groover by Darrell Moses 
was an attempt to recruit you into I.L* 
Williams? right? 
A: Like I say, it was a dual-purpose. That's 
correct. 
Q: So, they attempted to recruit you, and 
as part of that recruitment, they told 
you may good things about Mr. Groover; 
didn't they? 
A: Yes. That's correct. . . . 
* * * 
Q: And they wanted to sell you, didn't they? 
They wanted you to participate? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: So, you met with Mr. Groover with that 
background? 
A: Yes. 
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With that background, and you were im-
pressed? 
I was more impressed later, that's correct. 
You went to sales seminars? 
Yes. 
* * * 
Did you see anyone giving money to Mr. Groover at 
the seminars? 
No, not at the seminars. 
Did you see anyone sign any deals with 
Mr. Groover at these seminars? 
No. 
And at that time you asked Mr. Groover, 
are you capable [of buying the Park], 
right? 
Correct. 
And he told you "yes?" 
That's correct. 
* * * 
Was there a reason you didn't ask Mr. 
Groover for any financials? 
I think at the time he wrote the offer, 
I had already been to the meeting at the 
Hotel Utah [where Mr. Groover was con-
ducting a seminar on purchases of diamonds 
and Egyptian artifacts — See Transcript 
p. 70, lines 1-6] and Larry had told me 
that his ability to purchase was based 
upon the clientele. And it is very diffi-
cult to remember what happened six years 
ago, and that is something that — I would 
think that I asked him for some financials 
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. . . but I would say that Larry didn't 
have financials available for me, and if 
I did ask for them, and he instructed me 
that his, that the strength of his case 
would be the fact that he would perform 
within 30 days. 
Transcript pp. 176-121. 
Mr. Larson went on to testify that he knew Mr. Groover 
dealt with an elite clientele because Mr. Groover told him that 
they were elite. (Transcript 122, pp. 1-7). 
Gary Larson conducted no other investigation of Mr. Groo-
ver's ability to purchase the Park yet he told his principal, Doran 
Hunt, that Groover was a good and capable buyer. Hunt Development 
Company submits that this evidence supports the trial court's find-
ing that Barnum-Broadbent and Larson were negligent and, thus, 
breached their fiduciary duty to Mr. Hunt. 
Concerning Barnum-Broadbent's failure to inform Doran 
Hunt that the Groover-Hoffmann earnest money check bounced, the 
Utah Supreme Court in Hopkins vs. Wardlev Corp., 611 P.2d 1204 
(1980) held that based upon the broker's failure to inform the 
seller of the highly unreliable nature of the buyer's earnest money 
check, the broker's fiduciary duty was breached. In that case, 
the broker assured the seller that the earnest money deposit had 
been received, but he failed to inform the seller that the check 
was drawn on the account of the broker's secretary who was the 
buyer's fiance, and that the broker did not independently verify 
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whether the check was good. The check, in fact, bounced, and when 
the sale fell through, the seller was left with no deposit to offset 
its damages. The Utah Supreme Court, based upon those facts, held 
that the seller relied upon the broker to his detriment and was, 
therefore, entitled to recover his damages. Although Doran Hunt 
did not suffer actual damages as a result of Barnum-Broadbent's 
failure to inform him that Groover-Hoffmann7s check bounced, this 
Court should apply the same rationale and hold that Barnum-Broadbent 
breached its fiduciary duty to Doran Hunt and, consequently, it 
is not entitled to its commission. See, Schroeder vs. Rose, 701 
P.2d 327 (Idaho App. 1985); Gibson Bowles. Inc. vs. Montgomery, 625 
P.2d 670 (Ore. App. 1981). 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURTS HOLDING THAT HUNT 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS 
ACTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1985) provides that: 
In civil actions where not otherwise provided 
by statute or agreement, the court may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that an action 
or the defense of the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith. 
The trial court found: 
1. That Barnum-Broadbent and Larson negligently misrepre-
sented to Doran Hunt the financial ability of Groover-Hoffmann to 
complete the transaction; 
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2. That Barnum-Broadbent and Larson failed to disclose 
to Doran Hunt the fact that the promissory note was not timely 
replaced by a company check and that when the company check came 
in it bounced; and 
3. That Barnum-Broadbent and Larson retained an attorney 
to file suit in an attempt to force Doran Hunt to accept a price 
and terms other than those he desired; 
If any case warrants an award of attorney's fees, it is 
this case. Through their negligence, Barnum-Broadbent and Larson 
induced Doran Hunt to sign the Groover-Hoffmann earnest money re-
ceipt. When Doran Hunt discovered that Groover-Hoffmann was a 
bad buyer, Barnum-Broadbent and Larson attempted to strong-arm 
Doran Hunt into selling to the Carlyle Group. When that failed, 
they brought suit primarily on the Groover-Hoffmann earnest money 
agreement arguing that they had produced a ready, willing and able 
purchaser. Any investigation on their part would have shown the 
opposite to be true. As such, the trial court's denial of defen-
dants' claim for their attorneys' fees should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a determination of the amount of fees that should 
be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
Barnum-Broadbent's claim to a commission for the following reasons: 
1. The intent of the parties to the Listing 
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Agreement was that no commission would be paid unless the 
property was sold to a purchaser produced by Barnum-Broadbent. 
No such sale was made. 
2. Groover-Hoffmann was not a ready, willing and able 
purchaser. 
3. The sale was not consummated because Groover-Hoffmann 
was not a ready, willing and able purchaser. 
4. Barnum-Broadbent breached its fiduciary duties to 
Hunt Development Company by failing to inform Doran Hunt that 
Groover-Hoffmann's check bounced and by negligently misrepre-
senting Groover-Hoffmann's financial ability to purchase the 
Park. 
This Court should also reverse the trial court's holding 
that Hunt Development Company is not entitled to an award of attor-
neys' fees. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 1987. 
DAVID R. OISEN, Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross 
Appellants 
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